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Given the scarce empirical research supporting the branch of 
literature investigating the shortcomings of the bail-in regime 
(Hadjiemmanuil, 2015; Walther & White, 2020; Tröger, 2020), 
this paper offers a contribution in this regard investigating 
the implications for bank risk posed by the amendments to 
the unsecured senior debt asset class required to enhance the bail-in 
regime. To this purpose, we use a sample of 46 banks distributed 
over 17 European countries over the period of Q1 2010–Q4 2019. 
We thus run a fixed effect panel data regression over the entire 
period and also over the subperiods before and after the start of 
the overhaul of the unsecured senior debt asset class. Our main 
result points out the significant role of unsecured senior debt in 
explaining bank’s risk after the start of the amendments campaign 
which allowed this asset class to serve the enhancement of 
the bail-in regime. We attribute this result to the uncertain gone-
concern loss-absorbing capacity of unsecured senior debt and its 
material cost exacerbated by the bail-in buffer shortfall of many 
European banks. Our result pique policymakers’ attention to 
the side-effects of the amendments to the bail-in regime and 
further guide bank managers’ decisions about regulatory funding 
strategies. 
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The aim of this paper is to delve into the implications 
for bank’s risk posed by the alignment of the bank’s 
capital structure to bail-in prescriptions.  
The legislative developments in the field of 
systemic banks and bank crisis management mark 
a change of route in the composition of the banks’ 
capital structure. Although Basel III has reduced 
the share of instruments different from CET1, 
the above-mentioned interventions have increased 
again the buffer of other loss-bearing liabilities.  
The implementation of the bail-in tool in 
the European bank resolution framework has indeed 
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required banks to meet at all times a minimum 
requirement for their own funds and eligible 
liabilities (MREL). 
However, things got complicated starting from 
1st January 2016 when Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive’s (BRRD) provisions extended 
the scope of bail-in from subordinated debt 
to unsecured bonds and uninsured depositors.  
It, therefore, resulted quite confounding for investors 
and supervisors to clearly quantify the actual stock 
of bail-inable liabilities, especially with respect to 
cross-border banking groups (Erzegovesi, 2017). 
As designed, moreover, even senior debt sold 
to retail customers may be subjected to bail-in 
causing hefty reputational damages for banks and 
undermining their capacity to raise retail funding 
at low costs (Resti, 2016).  
In addition, misalignments in the creditors’ 
insolvency hierarchy across member states and 
the resulting litigations that may arise from 
the violation of the no-creditor-worse-off (NCWO) 
principle together with the ample discretion given to 
authorities regarding the decision about to whether 
exclude some liabilities from the bail-in further 
complicated the framework.  
To address these shortcomings, regulators set 
out the MREL subordination requirement which 
requires banks to meet the MREL with instruments 
that rank in insolvency below other liabilities that 
are either not bail-inable by law or difficult to bail-in.  
To efficiently abide by the subordination 
requirement, some European countries have amended 
the rules regarding the insolvency hierarchy of 
unsecured senior debt under their national 
insolvency legislation. These amendments split 
the asset class represented by unsecured senior debt 
into two categories: non-preferred and preferred 
senior debt. The former is eligible to meet 
the subordination requirement and is meant to allow 
banks to efficiently pile up the buffer consisting of 
bail-inable liabilities as non-preferred senior debt is 
less expensive than other subordinated liabilities.  
Preferred senior debt instead is not eligible to 
meet the subordination requirement but can still 
be accounted, under certain conditions, within 
the MREL buffer and also be bailed-in if necessary.  
This is the approach pursued by France. Similarly, 
Germany and Italy introduced preferential treatment 
for other senior claims against an outstanding 
senior bond, which makes most outstanding senior 
bonds eligible for MREL. Other member states 
instead opted for a different subordination approach. 
Spanish banks followed the contractual approach 
whereas the UK, given the legal structure of their 
banks, followed the structural solution. 
At the EU level, these amendments culminated 
with the entry into force of the Directive 2017/2399, 
which supports the French solution and harmonises 
the ranking of unsecured senior debt across 
the member states. The Directive, therefore, allows 
also those banks of countries that did not amend 
their insolvency law to issue non-preferred senior 
debt and so being effective in piling-up the bail-in 
buffer. As a result, unsecured senior debt, especially 
in its non-preferred format, plays a crucial role in 
shaping the banks’ capital structure in a consistent 
way with the bail-in regime so as to make the bail-in 
tool effective in case of resolution.  
Non-preferred senior debt represents, however, 
a competitive advantage for larger institutes, as it 
allows them to comply with the MREL requirement 
in a more efficient way than the smaller ones. 
Mid-sized banks, whose business model and funding 
strategy are incompatible with large bond issuances, 
would not be able to take advantage of non-preferred 
senior bonds. As a result, these banks could struggle 
to comply with the MREL requirement, as it would be 
rather expensive to pile up the MREL buffer by using 
other subordinated liabilities.  
This topic is prominent nowadays, as 
the debate over the applicability of the bail-in also 
to smaller banks is taking hold among European 
authorities. Nevertheless, complying with the MREL 
requirement could be demanding also for banks able 
to tap the market of non-preferred senior bonds.  
The bail-in regime is indeed not only 
transforming the banks’ capital structure but is also 
increasing its intrinsic costs by transferring risk 
from taxpayers to unsecured bondholders (Crespi, 
Giacomini, & Mascia, 2019).  
As investors in senior unsecured debt are those 
more affected by the change of route from bail-out 
to bail-in policies, especially by the above-mentioned 
amendments on the asset class, they are expected 
to ask for a higher risk premium, thereby materially 
affecting the banks’ cost of debt. In addition, such 
an impact is further exacerbated by the material 
MREL deficit of EU banks (García & Rocamora, 2018). 
Furthermore, doubts arise as to whether 
unsecured senior debt actually fulfils its purpose to 
enhance the bail-in tool. The bail-in, indeed, suffers 
from credibility problems that stem from 
the political and regulatory discretion that might 
hamper its application (Hadjiemmanuil, 2015; 
Walther & White, 2020).  
The resulting uncertainty regarding its prompt 
and full application in case of crisis may therefore 
jeopardise the efforts made to enhance its 
framework. As a result, the large issuances of 
unsecured senior debt, especially in its non-preferred 
format, may turn out to be counterproductive as, 
instead of an efficient precaution, they may weigh 
on bank operativity.  
Uncertainty further impedes investors from 
correctly price bank risk into securities as they are 
not able to predict their loss exposure in case of 
bail-in. The resulting mispricing may therefore 
jeopardise bank operativity and further exacerbate 
systemic adverse effects in case of crisis  
(Tröger, 2020).  
To sum up, large issuances of unsecured senior 
debt, especially in its non-preferred format, could 
sharply increase the cost of debt of banks able 
to tap this market and also cut off those that are not 
familiar with the international bond market as they 
struggle to change their capital structure in a way 
coherent with the bail-in regime. 
Moreover, these efforts could be jeopardised by 
the lack of credibility of the bail-in regime that could 
lead competent authorities to pursue different crisis 
management techniques which do not involve 
the employment of such resources. 
Given these issues, the research question that 
this paper seeks to answer is whether the increasing 
weight of unsecured senior debt within the bank 
capital structure is affecting the bank’s risk. 
Providing an empirical study of this relationship, 
we contribute to the extensive theoretical literature 
investigating the shortcomings of the bail-in regime. 
Despite providing thoughtful insights about 
the authorities’ discretion (Walther & White, 2020), 
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the political interests (Hadjiemmanuil, 2015),  
and the investor’s concerns (Tröger, 2020), such 
literature is inadequately supported by empirical 
evidence.  
Our sample consists of 46 EU banks distributed 
over 17 member states. We collect from Bloomberg 
quarterly bank-level and country-level data  
over the period Q1 2010–Q4 2019. We, therefore, 
implement a fixed effects panel data regression 
to study the relationship between a bank’s risk and 
the weight of unsecured senior debt within the bank 
capital structure. 
Our main result points out that the weight of 
unsecured senior debt became relevant as the bank’s 
risk driver after the amendments campaign which 
allowed this asset class to serve the enhancement of 
the bail-in regime.  
We explain this result with the scarce 
contribution of unsecured senior debt to the bank’s 
loss bearing capacity and its material costs caused 
by the replacement of bail-out policies with a bail-in 
regime and further exacerbated by the bail-in buffer 
shortfall of many European banks. 
These results indicate to policymakers 
the possible side-effects of the implementation 
of the bail-in regime amendments to the unsecured 
senior debt asset class and are also useful to bank 
managers when planning their regulatory funding 
strategies. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 discusses the relevant literature and 
provides an overview of the bail-in buffer regulation. 
Section 3 describes the sample and the methodology 
employed. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section provides a review of the relevant 
literature regarding the shortcomings of the bail-in 
regime and the resulting implications in terms of 
bank operativity, which provide the cornerstone  
on which some hypothesis about the relationship 
between bank risk and the alignment of  
the bank’s capital structure to bail-in prescriptions 
are developed. 
Regarding credibility, the bail-in regime is 
disciplined by a tangled and complicated mass of 
regulation whose main vulnerability lies in the major 
discretion allowed to the authorities involved in 
the resolution process. In particular, Hadjiemmanuil 
(2015) points out the crucial role played by political 
authorities in the decision process for the imposition 
of the bail-in indicating their discretion as 
fundamental in determining bail-in credibility. 
Moreover, national politicians may also back down 
to short-term political pressures for bailouts. Then, 
Walther and White (2020) focus on the regulator’s 
discretion. They develop a model in which regulators 
decide upon resolution actions with discretion after 
analyzing private information regarding the bank’s 
viability. Their results show that regulators with bad 
news and discretion have incentives to conduct 
excessively weak bail-in policies due to the costly 
consequences that the signal of a bail-in may trigger, 
such as bank runs. Philippon and Salord (2017) 
further indicate the large flexibility granted to 
authorities as the main concern for bail-in application. 
In order to enhance credibility, the authors suggest 
the application of the bail-in to medium-sized ailing 
banks as their systematic relevance is often 
overestimated.  
The uncertainty resulting from the ample 
discretion granted to authorities regarding bail-in 
application also jeopardises the investors’ ability to 
predict the outcome in case of bail-in. As a result, 
investors are not able to correctly price bail-inable 
securities in line with the risks they are going 
to incur in case of bail-in. Mispricing thus opens up 
to two different possibilities: underpricing, which 
may cause a moral hazard, or overpricing which, due 
to harsher refinancing costs, may hamper lending 
capacity, therefore, impairing growth. In addition, 
in case of mispricing, an unanticipated bail-in during 
a financial crisis might cause an overreactive price 
correction in bond yields resulting in a liquidity 
freeze and collapse of the interbank market  
(Noller, 2018). The investor’s predictability of 
outcome emerges, therefore, as a material problem 
that pledges to hamper the bail-in application. 
Moreover, this problem appears also to be unsolved 
by the enhancements to the bail-in regime  
as not even a sufficient MREL, which mitigates 
the confusion caused by the discretionary 
exemptions from bail-in for certain liabilities and 
by the NCWO principle, is able to tackle investors’ 
uncertainty. The latter, indeed, would still be 
hampered by the degree of administrative discretion 
inherent in the resolution process (Tröger, 2020). 
Some actual cases of crisis management can 
give the extent of the credibility issue suffered by 
bail-in. In the Eurozone, since the creation of 
the Single Resolution Board (SRB), the resolution 
has been decided by the SRB just once with regard to 
the Banco Popular Español case of 6th June 2017.  
On that occasion, the resolution was deployed 
in three phases: 1) write-down of CET1 and 
AT1 capital; 2) conversion into equity of all Tier 2 
capital; 3) transfer of shares converted to Banco 
Santander for 1 euro. Regardless of the favourable 
comments by the authorities involved, doubts 
remain as to whether the bank became insolvent 
because of the bank-run on the wholesale funding, 
fostered by the thereat of the bail-in, or because  
of the capital deficit detected afterwards during 
resolution. Moreover, the later cases of banks in 
distress, such as the Banca Popolare di Vicenza  
and Veneto Banca in Italy, or Ablv Banka and  
As Pnv Banka in Latvia have not been managed 
according to BRRD provisions (Erzegovesi, 2020). 
In addition to the bad design of bail-in rules, 
scholars’ attention has been piqued also by bail-in 
implications for bank operativity. In detail, 
the introduction of the bail-in regime marks a break 
from the previous bail-out era by transferring risk 
from taxpayers to unsecured bank creditors.  
Given the worsening of their risk-profile, bail-inable 
investors will therefore ask for higher returns in 
comparison to non-bail-inable investors.  
Some explorative studies have therefore 
empirically addressed the question. J. P. Morgan 
suggested that the introduction of bail-in would 
result in an expected increase of 87 basis points 
in the long-term debt yield for a single A-rated bank 
(J. P. Morgan, 2011). Moreover, The European 
Commission has estimated an overall increase in 
bank funding costs of 31.6 basis points (European 
Commission, 2012). 
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Moreover, the study conducted by Crespi et al. 
(2019) over a sample of 1,798 fixed-rate bonds 
issued by Italian banks during the period  
of 2013–2016 finds out an increase in the spread 
at issuance of bail-inable bonds compared to non-
bail-inable bonds after the enforcement of the bail-in 
in 2016. In a similar vein, Giuliana (2019) explores 
the impact of bail-in events, both legislative and 
related to its enforcement, on a sample of 23,756 EU 
bonds between 2012 and 2016. As both studies 
measure the impact of bail-in on the yield spread 
between bail-inable and non-bail-inable bonds,  
which literature deems a reliable measure of bail-in 
credibility, their results point out higher expectations 
of bail-in among investors, therefore, supporting 
the credibility of the bail-in.  
Contrarily, Pablos (2019) does not find any 
increase in the subordinated spread, namely 
the difference between subordinated bonds’ yields 
and senior unsecured bond’s yields, by analysing 
the impact of the EU implementation of the bail-in 
regime for 41 EU credit institutions over the period 
of Q4 2014–Q2 2018. Consistently, Chan-Lau and 
Oura (2016) point out only a modest increase in 
senior unsecured debt yields which does not support 
the thesis of a credible bail-in. 
In addition to the impact on the cost of debt, 
literature has also expressed the bail-in implications 
for banks’ business model. In order to enhance 
bail-in credibility, the abovementioned study by 
Philippon and Salord (2017) suggests applying 
bail-in to medium-sized banks, however, most of 
them present a retail-oriented business model, 
mostly funded with capital and deposits, which 
makes them unsuitable for the bail-in.  
Referred to as ―middle class‖ by Fernando 
Restoy, Chairman of the Financial Stability Institute, 
these banks, in case of crisis, are generally too large 
to be subjected to normal insolvency proceedings 
but also unprepared to align their capital structure 
to the recent amendments in terms of subordinated 
bail-inable instruments as they are unfamiliar with 
the international bond market whose access may 
further result economically unfeasible (Restoy, 2016, 
2018). As a result, these banks may lack the sufficient 
loss-absorbency capacity required by the bail-in 
thereby hampering its application or causing 
counterproductive effects if the bail-in would be 
forced. As the number of these banks is potentially 
material and the regulator efforts are focused on 
tailoring the bail-in rules for systemically important 
groups, then the bail-in applicability to this class of 
banks becomes a relevant subject of analysis which 
further casts some shadows about bail-in credibility. 
On the basis of the above, we have developed 
the following hypotheses to test: 
H
0
: The weight of unsecured senior debt does 
not affect the bank’s risk. Specifically, the weight of 
unsecured senior debt does neither weigh on banks’ 
cost of debt nor is perceived as unnecessary  
in case of crisis. 
H1: The weight of unsecured senior debt 
increases the bank’s risk. Specifically, this relationship 
would corroborate our thesis of a negative effect of 
large issuances of non-preferred senior bonds as well 
as preferred senior bonds to comply with bail-in 
rules, that weighs on banks’ cost of debt and is 
further perceived as unnecessary in cases of crisis 
as bail-in suffers from severe credibility issues.  
For smaller banks, this relationship demonstrates 
the incompatibility of such banks with the bail-in 
regime and the struggle they are facing in  
coping with it. 
H2: The weight of unsecured senior debt 
decreases the bank’s risk. Specifically, the increasing 
weight of unsecured senior debt proves the soundness 
and resilience of the bank as it is able to attract 
capital, abide by bail-in rules, and further expand 
its activities. With regard to smaller banks, this 
relationship accounts for a lower MREL buffer for 
such banks and also discounts lower expectations 
over the extension of the bail-in regime also to 
these banks. 
 
2.1. Regulatory framework 
 
In the afterwards of the global financial crisis (GFC), 
one of the key objectives pursued by the regulatory 
overhaul has been focused on strengthening 
the banks’ capital base. In Europe, the Directive 
2014/59/EU, known as BRRD, introduced the MREL, 
which ensures that banks hold a sufficient amount 
of bail-inable liabilities in order to grant their 
stand-alone loss-bearing and recapitalization capacity 
in case of resolution.  
Almost at the same time, on 9 November 2015, 
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) established 
international principles and a term sheet (the FSB 
TLAC Term Sheet) that set out internationally agreed 
rules regarding the total loss-absorbing capacity 
(TLAC) for global systemically important banks 
(G-SIBs). Accordingly, cross-border banking groups 
of systemic relevance, whose failure may threaten 
the stability of the entire financial system, have been 
required to pile up a buffer of securities and other 
liabilities that should be promptly available in case 
of distress to bear the losses. 
TLAC and MREL are conceptually equivalent but 
diverge under specific aspects related to their scope, 
calibration, application, and eligibility criteria.  
Regarding the scope, the MREL applies to all 
credit institutions in the EU whereas TLAC applies to 
G-SIBs only. 
Regarding calibration, whilst in the case  
of the TLAC, the FSB provides for a minimum 
requirement which each G-SIB is obliged to respect, 
in the case of the MREL the BRRD does not set out 
a minimum level or target but designs the MREL as 
an institution-specific requirement which has to be 
tailored to each individual bank. The different 
approach stems from the broader scope of the MREL 
which needs to account for differences in banks’ 
size, risk profile, organizational structure, and 
systemic importance. Moreover, differences emerge 
also in the calculation of the two requirements.  
The TLAC Term Sheet drafted by the FSB in 
November 2015 makes provision for a minimum 
TLAC standard equal to 16% of the risk-weighted 
assets (RWAs) of the bank and 6% of its leverage 
ratio exposure (LRE). These percentages have 
a binding effect from 1st January 2019. They will 
subsequently be increased to 18% of the RWAs and 
6.75% of the LRE as soon as the TLAC enters its full 
regime (1st January 2022). 
The MREL requirement, instead, consists of two 
fundamental components, identifiable according to 
the function that the eligible resources need to 
guarantee during the resolution process of the bank. 
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These components are the loss absorption amount 
(LAA) and the recapitalization amount (RCA).  
The first aggregate is compulsory for all the banking 
intermediaries and represents the set of instruments 
that are most appropriate for guaranteeing the loss-
absorption. The resources which compose the LAA 
have to appear in the balance sheet prior to  
the start of the crisis management process (Crespi & 
Mascia, 2018). To be more specific, the LAA is equal 
to the greater of the following two amounts:  
a) the sum of the requirements of Pillar I, Pillar 2 
(P2R), and the combined buffer ratio (CBR), together 
with any further supervisory review and evaluation 
process (SREP) requirements; b) the amount defined 
by the compulsory leverage ratio requirement. 
The RCA is only binding for those institutions 
for which an ex-ante resolution submission was 
approved in the event of their failure. The available 
instruments in the RCA are therefore intended to 
re-establish the regulatory capital of the bank after 
the losses have been absorbed. On a technical basis, 
the RCA is determined by the maximum value  
of the following amounts: a) the sum of the Pillar I 
and P2R requirements; b) the amount defined by 
the compulsory leverage ratio requirement. 
In the definition of the RCA, an incremental 
component may be provided. This is represented by 
the so-called ―market confidence charge‖ (MCC), 
which is intended to maintain market confidence 
following the resolution process of the intermediary 
(SRB, 2018). The relevant provisions set a calibration 
equal to the CBR of the bank minus 125 basis points. 
Further adjustments to the MREL requirement 
are provided by the deposit guarantee schemes 
(DGS) adjustment and the SREP adjustment (SREPA). 
Regarding the former, an amount equal to  
the contribution of the specific bank towards 
the DGS for the resolution process must be deducted 
from the values related to the LAA, the RCA, and 
the MCC components, as it is provided for in 
Article 6 of the Directive 2016/1450 of the European 
Commission (Dreke & Wollinsky, 2017). Regarding 
the latter, the resolution authority is required 
to quantify a component, positive or negative, which 
should account for the individual characteristic 
of each bank.  
In the standard case of a systemic bank, these 
procedures allow for the definition of a MREL  
similar to the minimum TLAC. The MREL is instead 
significantly lower in the case of small banks which 
are likely to be subjected to insolvency proceedings.  
Different from TLAC, which has to be 
expressed in percentage of RWA and also requires 
a backstop related to the leverage ratio, the MREL 
target needs to be expressed in percentage of  
the total liabilities and own funds (TLOF). 
Calculations based on the TLOF are required to 
determine the access to national and supranational 
resolution funds or other programs of public 
support. Access to these funds is indeed subject to 
the bail-in of at least 8% of a bank’s TLOF.  
In addition, the support provided by these funds can 
exceed 5% of the TLOF.  
Another difference between the two frameworks 
regards subordination. The TLAC rules indeed 
require global systemically important institutions 
(G-SIIs) to meet the minimum requirement with 
subordinated liabilities that rank in insolvency below 
liabilities excluded from TLAC. Subordination can be 
met a) contractually, through the contract relating to 
the particular financial instrument, b) statutorily, 
through national law in an individual member state, 
and c) structurally, through the specific corporate 
structure of the banking group. The BRRD instead 
does not provide for mandatory subordination of 
MREL instruments but the resolution authority can 
set a requirement on a case-by-case basis. 
Given the misalignment between the TLAC and 
the MREL frameworks, the European Commission 
has deployed a series of amendments, contained 
in the so-called ―banking package‖, 2016, to 
the current banking directives and regulations 
(BRRD, Capital Requirements Regulation and Directive 
(CRR/CRD)) with the purpose of harmonizing  
the G-SIBs’ MREL with the TLAC standard and adapt 
MREL rules to the other classes of banks.  
In short, the banking package implements 
the TLAC for G-SIIs into EU law, adapts the MREL 
calibration in order to ensure a sufficient loss 
absorption and recapitalization capacity for  
banks, and also strengthens and standardizes 
the subordination rules.  
The new provisions, therefore, classify banks in 
four categories adapting the MREL calibration and 
subordination to each of them. The MREL is now 
expressed in the percentage of the RWAs and the LRE. 
The four categories of banks are the following: 
1) G-SIBs; 2) top-tier banks, namely those banks 
whose resolution group’s consolidated size is above 
EUR 100 bn; 3) ―fished‖ banks, namely non-GSII  
and non-top-tier banks which are selected by 
the national resolution authority as likely to pose 
a systemic threat in case of failure; 4) other banks. 
The minimum MREL requirement for EU G-SIIs 
is set as the highest between 16% of RWAs and 6% of 
LRE until Q1 2022. Starting from this date, the ratios 
are raised up to 18% of RWAs and 6.75% of the LRE. 
Starting from Q1 2024, a further ratio of 8% of TLOF 
applies to EU G-SIIs. Regarding subordination,  
EU G-SIIs have to comply with a mandatory 
subordination requirement which coincides with 
the minimum MREL requirement set out for 2024 
(equal to the highest between 18% of the RWAs, 
6.75% of the LRE, or 8% of the TLOFs). 
Regarding top-tier and fished-banks, 
the minimum MREL requirement remains institution-
specific until Q1 2022. Starting from this date, 
the minimum MREL requirement is set as the highest 
between 13,5% of RWAs and 5% of LRE. Starting from 
Q1 2024, a further ratio of 8% of TLOF is applied. 
The subordination requirement coincides with 
the minimum MREL requirement for top-tier banks 
and fished banks, although under certain conditions 
for the latter.  
Regarding the class of ―other banks‖, the MREL 
requirement qualifies as an individual bank-specific 
requirement, and subordination is decided by 
the resolution authority which decides upon its level 
on a case-by-case basis.  
The banking package further provides banks 
with new tools to achieve subordination. In detail, 
the asset class of unsecured senior debt is split into 
two categories: senior preferred debt and senior 
non-preferred debt. Of these two classes, only 
the latter is eligible to meet the MREL subordination 
requirement whereas preferred senior debt is only 
bail-inable but can still be counted towards the MREL 
under specific conditions. 
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Senior non-preferred bonds are designed to 
help banks piling up efficiently the MREL buffer and 
further address the issues related to the violation of 
the no-creditor-worse-off principle, which requires 
that creditors do not suffer higher losses in 
resolution than those that they would have suffered 
in case of normal insolvency proceedings, as 
this new asset class clearly distinguishes between 
bail-inable and non-bailinable instruments, therefore, 
tackling investor’s uncertainty regarding the actual 
stock of bail-inable debt available in case of bail-in. 
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This paper investigates whether the bank capital 
structure alignment to the bail-in rules has 
implications in terms of the bank’s risk. More in 
detail, we analyse the relationship between bank risk 
and the increasing weight of unsecured senior debt 
within the bank capital structure following 
the recent amendments which split the unsecured 
senior debt asset class to ease the pile-up of 
the MREL and the overall bail-in application. 
We proceed by collecting from Bloomberg 
quarterly bank-level and country-level data over 
the period from the first quarter of 2010 to the last 
quarter of 2019. The sample selection strategy 
consists of focusing on European banks subjected  
to MREL or TLAC, and their subordination 
requirements as well, which are therefore affected 
by the re-design of the unsecured senior asset class. 
Among them, we selected those with available data 
regarding the outstanding amount of unsecured 
senior bonds. As designed, the sample selection 
procedure produced a sample of 46 banks 
distributed over 17 European countries (AT, BE, CZ, 
DK, FR, DE, GR, HU, IT, NL, NO, PO, PT, ES, SE, CH, 
and GB). Table 1 provides a detailed list of the banks 
included in the sample, together with their 
total assets. 
 
Table 1. The sample by banks 
 
Country Bank name 
Total assets 
(in millions) 
Country Bank name 
Total assets 
(in millions) 
Austria Erste Group Bank AG 215103.4 Italy Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 704027.9 
Austria Raiffeisen Bank 129984 Italy Mediobanca SpA 74387 
Belgium KBC Group NV 282350 Italy UBI Banca 125656 
Czech Republic Komerční Banka AS 34723 Italy Unicredit SpA 881531 
Denmark Danske Bank A/S 465096 Netherlands ING Bank NV 1032654 
Denmark Jyske Bank A/S 58918 Norway DNB ASA 287503 
Denmark Sydbank A/S 19674 Poland mBank SA 27848 
France BNP Paribas SA 2082181 Poland 
Powszechna Kasa 
Oszczędności Bank Polski SA 
57724 
France Crédit Agricole SA 1640596 Portugal Banco BPI SA 39577 
France Société Générale 1288214 Portugal Banco Comercial Português 82548 
Germany Aareal Bank AG 45201 Spain 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria SA 
652104 
Germany Bayerische Landesbank 257872 Spain Banco de Sabadell 172648 
Germany Commerzbank AG 592393 Spain Banco Santander SA 1321501 




194224 Spain CaixaBank SA 339465 





Eurobank Ergasias Services 
and Holdings SA 
71318 Sweden Svenska Handelsbanken AB 286031 
Greece National Bank of Greece SA 95555 Sweden Swedbank AB 225909 
Hungary OTP Bank Nyrt 38119 Switzerland Credit Suisse Group AG 764290 
Italy Banca Carige SpA 34631 UK Barclays Bank PLC 1616179 
Italy Banca Monte Paschi di Siena 185855 UK HSBC Bank PLC 2149338 
Italy Credito Emiliano SpA 35675 UK Lloyds Bank PLC 1050429 
Italy Credito Valtellinese SpA 27123 UK Royal Bank of Scotland PLC 1283432 
Note: This table displays the banks covered in this study and their size. Total assets are in millions and their value is the average over 
the entire sample period 2010–2019. 
 
Almost the entire sample (81%) consists of 
banks whose total assets exceed the threshold of 
50 billion euros, which is commonly assumed 
to distinguish banks that follow a bail-in strategy 
as opposed to those which follow an alternative 
process (García & Rocamora, 2018). The remaining 
banks (19%) can be regarded as smaller banks.  
Given the sample composition, we are able to address 
the critical issues introduced by the amendments to 
the recovery and resolution framework on both large 
and smaller banks.  
We use a research design similar to that 
employed by Beltrame, Grassetti, Polato, and Velliscig 
(2020) which study the effect of the introduction 
of a valuation metric within the European Central 
Bank’s (ECB) asset quality review (AQR) exercise 
on banks’ third party pricing policies. In detail, 
the authors implement a fixed effect panel data 
regression over three periods: 1) the entire 
time-period, 2) the sub-period before the introduction 
of a valuation metric within the ECB’s AQR exercise, 
and 3) the sub-period after. As a result, the authors 
have an overview of the phenomenon but can also 
discern the effect before and after the specific event. 
In a similar vein, to study the relationship between 
bank’s risk and the weight of senior unsecured debt 
in the capital structure of banks, we run a fixed 
effect panel data regression considering the entire 
time period and the periods before and after 
the first national amendment to the unsecured 
senior asset class. The regression model is: 
 
                                                             (1) 
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where,          is the dependent variable, namely 
Bloomberg’s 1-year probability of default of bank j 
at time t. Bank’s risk is thus approximated by 
Bloomberg’s 1-year probability of default whose 
score results from a model which uses the following 
nine inputs: credit default swap (CDS) spread, 
the volatility of the stock price, the net income, 
non-performing loans, market-to-book ratio, total 
assets, short-term leverage, long-term leverage, and 
loan losses reserves. 
The main independent variable             is 
the ratio of outstanding senior unsecured bonds to 
risk-weighted assets of bank j at time t.  
The variable         is a vector of bank-level 
control variables which includes capitalization 
(namely the ratio of Tier 1 to total assets — T1TA), 
business model (namely the ratio of deposits to total 
assets — DEPTA), risk (namely the ratio between non-
performing loans and total assets — NPLTA), size 
(namely the natural logarithm of total assets — lnTA) 
and profitability (namely the return on assets — ROA).  
The variable            is a vector of 
country-level control variables which includes 
a gross domestic product of countries (GDP) and 
unemployment rate (UNP). The variable    captures 
the time trends, whereas the variable    captures 
instead the bank fixed effects. Table 2 provides 
the descriptive statistics of the variables included 
in the regression together with their definition. 
 
Table 2. List of variables used together with their definition and summary statistics 
 
Variable Description Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
B1YDP The Bloomberg’s 1 year default probability 0.00003 0.21154 0.00760 0.00332 0.01979 
SUNSRWA The ratio of senior unsecured bonds to risk-weighted assets 0.01464 0.70697 0.21315 0.16618 0.17459 
lnTA The natural logarithm of total assets 9.78240 14.73587 12.27289 12.32227 1.40374 
T1TA The ratio of Tier 1 to total assets 0.02195 0.12290 0.05712 0.05364 0.01967 
NPLTA The ratio of non-performing loans to total assets 0.00175 0.30184 0.04906 0.02793 0.06089 
DEPTA The ratio of total deposits to total assets 0.14797 0.82890 0.46048 0.45959 0.14554 
ROA The return on assets -1.16060 1.26490 0.28800 0.32960 0.55766 
GDP The gross domestic product rate -3.99822 3.41113 0.31187 0.37939 0.71324 
UNP The unemployment rate 2.2 27.8 9.81724 8.19705 6.10587 
Note: This table reports the definition and summary statistics of variables used in regression (equation (1)).  
Source: Bloomberg (2010–2019). 
 
As it is mentioned above, the regression is run 
over three different time periods. First, it is run over 
the entire time window of 2010–2019 (Model 3). 
We then split the time window in order to capture 
the evolution of the role of unsecured senior debt 
within the capital structure of banks from the bail-out 
era to the introduction of the bank recovery and 
resolution framework. The former covers the time 
window between 2010 to 2016 (Model 1) whereas 
the latter covers the period of 2017–2019 (Model 2). 
We select 2016 as a reference year because the first 
legislative acts that enabled banks to issue non-
preferred senior debt entered into force in late 2016, 
thereby opening the segment of non-preferred 
senior bonds. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 3 shows the results of the regression. 
 
Table 3. The relationship between risk and the share of senior unsecured bonds 
 
B1YDP (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
Time window 2010–2016 2017–2019 Full period 
SUNS/RWA 
-0.0102 0.1105* -0.0064 
(0.0064) (0.0474) (0.0054) 
LNTA 
-0.0044 -0.0944*** -0.0101* 
(0.0039) (0.0270) (0.0041) 
T1/TA 
-0.3395** -0.6903 -0.3736*** 
(0.1316) (0.4720) (0.1115) 
NPL/TA 
0.0871 0.1240 0.0997* 
(0.0467) (0.1607) (0.0414) 
DEP/TA 
-0.0056 -0.1218* -0.0056 
(0.0094) (0.0506) (0.0074) 
ROA 
-0.0076*** -0.0161** -0.0119*** 
(0.0014) (0.0054) (0.0018) 
GDP 
-0.0008 0.0008 -0.0009 
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0006) 
UNP 
0.0006 -0.0026 0.0003 
(0.0004) (0.0016) (0.0003) 
Obs. 1,219 551 1,770 
R2 0.42 0.56 0.37 
Notes: The table shows the results of estimating equation (1) over the periods: 2010–2016 (Model 1); 2017–2019 (Model 2);  
2010–2019 (Model 3). Obs. is the number of observations in the relative time window; R2 is the R-squared. Robust standard errors 
are reported in brackets. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
The relationship between the weight of senior 
unsecured debt and bank’s risk is slightly negative 
over the entire period and not statistically 
significant. However, when we consider the two 
sub-periods, the relationship appears strongly 
positive since European banks have started testing 
the market of senior non-preferred debt. Thus, this 
result supports H1 about the weight of unsecured 
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senior debt increasing bank’s risk. During 
the previous period, instead, the results resemble 
those obtained over the entire period showing 
a slightly negative and statistically insignificant 
relationship. 
Regarding bank-level control variables, size 
shows a negative relationship with bank’s risk which 
is consistent over the three different time windows. 
The negative sign can be explained by means  
of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) issue which points out 
the likelihood for banks whose failure may threaten 
the banking system as well as the overall economy 
to receive public support in case of crisis. 
Accordingly, indeed, the higher the size, the lower 
the risk of insolvency. Moreover, despite the fact 
that the recovery and resolution framework aims at 
ending the TBTF issue, the latter still persists due to 
the severe credibility issues suffered by the bail-in 
regime which explains the negative sign between 
bank size and risk also in Model 2. In addition, 
the relationship strengthens in Model 2 gaining 
a higher statistical significance which supports 
the literature highly debated thesis of size playing 
a crucial role in easing the implementation of 
the recent amendments to the bail-in regime.  
Capitalization shows a negative relationship 
with the bank’s risk which is consistent over 
the three models. The negative sign is given by 
the fact that better-capitalized banks have a greater 
buffer that protects them from breaching 
the threshold of the minimum capital requirement, 
therefore, resulting less risky. The relationship 
is statistically significant in Model 1 and 3 but not 
in Model 2, as the relevant asset class explaining risk 
after the recovery and resolution framework is 
unsecured senior debt.  
The ratio between non-performing loans and 
total assets shows a positive relationship with 
the bank’s risk which is consistent over the three 
models. As broadly recognized in literature and 
further proved by the Spanish case of Banco Popular 
Español, the higher the share of non-performing 
loans, the higher the bank’s risk. This relationship is 
statistically significant only for Model 3.  
The ratio between deposits and total assets 
shows a negative relationship with the bank’s risk as 
the higher the customer base, the lower bank’s risk. 
The relationship is statistically significant only 
in Model 2. 
The return on assets shows a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with the banks’ 
risk consistent across the three models. The negative 
sign is explained by the fact that the lower 
the profitability, the higher the probability of 
default, given that profitability is a key variable for 
a bank’s viability.  
Regarding country-level control variables: 
the GDP shows a negative and statistically 
insignificant relationship with bank’s risk in Model 1 
and 3, the sign turns positive in Model 2 but 
the relationship is still statistically insignificant.  
The unemployment shows a positive but statistically 
insignificant relationship with bank’s risk in Model 1 
and 3, the sign turns negative in Model 2 but 
the relationship is still statistically insignificant.  
The main result that emerges from this analysis 
points out the crucial role played by unsecured 
senior debt in explaining bank’s risk following 
the bail-in regime amendments which put this 
asset class at the centre of a regulatory overhaul  
whose purpose is the enhancement of bail-in 
implementation.  
In detail, the unsecured senior debt asset class is 
split into two categories, preferred and non-preferred 
senior debt, which would help banks piling up 
efficiently the bail-in buffer and further address those 
shortcomings which stem from the uncertainty 
about the actual stock of bail-inable debt.  
However, our analysis points out a negative 
relationship between bank risk and the stock of 
unsecured senior debt, therefore, bringing out 
the possible side-effects of the policies deployed 
to enhance the bail-in regime.  
Specifically, in line with the branch of literature 
listing the credibility issues suffered by the bail-in 
regime, we point out the uncertain loss-bearing 
capacity of unsecured senior debt in case of 
the resolution against a certain additional cost, 
due to the fact that investors in unsecured senior 
debt faced a change of paradigm from bailout to 
bail-in that led them to ask for higher risk-premia. 
In short, the uncertainty regarding 
the fulfilment of their purpose in case of resolution 
together with the certain cost, also material due to 
the bail-in buffer shortfall of most of EU banks, 
related to these instrument poses a serious concern 
to bank operativity which result in higher risk.  
As regards smaller banks, instead, which 
account for 20% of our sample size, the negative 
relationship between bank risk and the stock of 
unsecured senior debt points out their difficulties 
in accessing the unfamiliar and expensive capital 
market as they struggle to comply with an unsuitable 
regulation with exacerbating the uncertainty 
regarding their crisis management in case of failure, 
as they are not able to adapt to bail-in rules but 
remain too systemic for being subjected to normal 
insolvency proceedings, and further calls for 





This paper studies the implications for bank’s risk 
which stem from the compliance to the recent 
amendments to the bail-in regime as regards 
the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in 
the insolvency hierarchy.  
According to literature and supported by 
the mismanagement of several bank crises, we deem 
that, despite helping banks piling up the bail-in 
buffer more efficiently and faster and addressing 
investor’s uncertainty regarding the actual bail-inable 
stock, these amendments may prove inadequate to 
serve their purposes of enhancing the bail-in regime. 
In detail, the bail-in shortcomings question the actual 
employment of these resources in case of resolution 
and so their loss bearing capacity. 
Moreover, the cost of these instruments, 
increased by the switch of paradigm from bail-out 
to bail-in that has affected investors in unsecured 
senior debt, combined with the material bail-in 
buffer shortfall of most EU banks weigh on 
the bank’s cost of debt.  
These implications concur to ground our 
research question about whether the crucial role 
assigned to unsecured senior debt is actually 
jeopardizing bank stability.  
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To this purpose, we use a sample of 46 banks 
distributed over 17 European countries over 
the period Q1 2010–Q4 2019. We thus run a fixed 
effect panel data regression over the entire period 
and also over the subperiods before and after 
the enforcement of the first amendment to 
the unsecured senior asset class. 
Our main result points out the significant role 
of unsecured senior debt in explaining bank’s risk 
after the start of the amendments campaign which 
allowed this asset class to serve the enhancement of 
the bail-in regime.  
From an academic standpoint, our work 
contributes to the branch of literature investigating 
bail-in credibility. This literature has indeed  
widely investigated the subject from a theoretical 
perspective but there is a lack of empirical research 
supporting such findings. This paper, therefore, 
aims to fill this gap by empirically addressing 
the concerns highlighted by theoretical literature 
and further providing a novel contribution focusing 
on bank’s risk.  
From a practical standpoint, our result warns 
policymakers about the side effects of the recent 
amendments to the bail-in regime which may 
hamper bank operativity from a cost perspective and 
also prove inefficient in case of resolution.  
Moreover, these results further support 
the instances of medium-sized bank managers 
who suffer from uncertainty regarding the crisis 
management regulation of their institutes as they 
are stuck in a grey zone between systemic financial 
institutions with active participation in the capital 
markets and unsystematic institutions subjected 
to normal insolvency proceedings. Our results, 
therefore, support the managers’ call for the design 
of an effective regime for managing medium-sized 
bank failures.  
In addition, the arguments we use to explain 
the negative relationship between bank risk and 
the stock of unsecured senior debt should 
encourage bank managers to focus on more 
loss-absorbing instruments when planning their 
regulatory funding strategies. Indeed, traditional 
subordinated debt (e.g., Tier 2 instruments), despite 
being more expensive, ensures higher reliability for 
resolution purposes as it performs better than 
unsecured senior debt in each of the eligibility 
requirements for instruments to be a computer 
within the regulatory capital.  
In detail, its lower subordination ensures its 
inherent and proved gone concern loss-absorbing 
capacity which concurs with its higher permanence 
and uncompromising remuneration in overperforming 
unsecured senior debt efficacy in resolution.  
As regards the limits of this study we point out 
the level of aggregation of the sample which gathers 
46 banks from 17 different European countries. 
As designed, our result provides just an overview of 
the relationship investigated which we deem could 
be deepened by harnessing a larger database to 
employ a state-level analysis able to gauge the effect 
of each national amendment of the unsecured senior 
asset class to bank risk.  
Finally, the COVID-19 outbreak has cast further 
shadows over bail-in credibility as governments may 
be tempted to recur to bail-out strategies in case of 
a bank crisis due to the firms’ fragile resilience.  
In this perspective, the implications of our results 
for policymakers and bank managers emerge as 
topical calling for lowering the regulatory pressure 
on banks and also indicating managers a more 
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